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1. Introduction 
Working with a large cross-section of countries, Brender and Drazen (2005) argued that 
empirical evidence of a political budget cycle exists but that the result is driven by a group of “new 
democracies”, which included Portugal. Since democracy was re-established in Portugal in 1974, 
the country has evolved from a “new” to an “established” democracy, which makes it an 
appropriate laboratory for further investigation of Brender and Drazen’s findings. Furthermore, 
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), analyzing political budget cycles in Russia after its transition 
to democracy, have found that the magnitude of the cycles decreased over time. While Russia is a 
decade-old democracy, young by all standards, democracy was re-established in Portugal thirty 
years ago, allowing us to analyse a substantially longer time span and to observe a transition from a 
new to an established democracy. 
In this article, we evaluate the influence of political forces on the allocation of 
intergovernmental grants in Portugal, and if their impact has changed as democracy matured. 
Besides opportunistic election cycles, we also analyse whether or not central governments distribute 
grants strategically among municipalities in order to enhance their chances of re-election. We test 
Cox and McCubbins’s (1986) hypothesis that risk-averse political candidates favour their 
supporters, against Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1987, 1993) argument that they target swing voters. 
We use a large, detailed, and unexplored dataset covering all mainland municipalities from 
1979 to 2002. The institutional structure of local governments and the policy instruments available 
are identical for all localities in Portugal, making this panel preferable to one composed of several 
countries, or states, with different institutions and policy instruments. The study of 
intergovernmental grants is particularly relevant because transfers from the central government 
represent the main source of funding for municipalities.1 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature; Section 
Veiga, Linda & Pinho, Maria Manuel  2
3 describes the Portuguese political and institutional framework; Section 4 presents the baseline 
empirical model; Section 5 reports the empirical results and, finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The literature 
The theory of fiscal federalism2 provides a normative framework for the assignment of 
functions to different levels of the public sector, and for the achievement of a balance between 
responsibilities and resources at each governmental level. Intergovernmental grants represent an 
important way to allocate funds among different levels of the public sector. The normative approach 
to such grants assumes that the central government is motivated mainly by efficiency and equity 
goals, seeking to maximize the general welfare of the population. 
The public choice literature has also provided some positive explanations for the allocation 
of intergovernmental grants. Policies conducted by the central government may be determined, at 
least partly, by an attempt to promote its own interests, which might simply depend upon the 
probability of re-election. Grants are seen as a strategic tool of central governments aiming at re-
election. In this context, two strands of literature are particularly relevant: the one on opportunistic 
political business cycles, and that on tactical redistribution. 
 
2.1. Literature on opportunistic political business cycles 
In the seventies, two seminal contributions, Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976), initiated 
the literature on opportunistic political business cycles. They presented models where opportunistic 
incumbents manipulate the economy before elections in order to maximize their probability of re-
election. By assuming the existence of an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, a political 
business cycle pattern emerges in which unemployment is unsustainably low in pre-election periods 
and unsustainably high in post-election periods. 
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With the rational expectations revolution, the hypothesis that incumbents could 
systematically manipulate real economic variables through pre-election demand shocks became 
untenable. Rational opportunistic business cycle models were developed based on the assumption 
that politicians differ in their level of competence, something they know better than the electorate. 
According to these models, before elections, incumbents take advantage of this asymmetry of 
information by manipulating economic policy instruments in order to appear as competent as 
possible. The best known signalling models of the rationality of pre-electoral manipulation are 
attributed to Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and Rogoff (1990). The first predicts an increase in public 
expenditures or a reduction of non-distorting taxes before elections. In the second, pre-election 
fiscal policy is biased toward easily observed consumption expenditures, and away from 
government investment. 
More recently, Drazen and Eslava (2006) developed a model that relies on imperfect 
information about the politicians’ preferences for different voter groups and about voting patterns 
over the population, rather than about the level of competence of the incumbent. In this model, 
politicians use election-year fiscal policy to influence electoral results, but the overall government 
budget deficit is not significantly affected. This is achieved by targeting types of spending preferred 
by voters in more swing regions at the expense of other expenditures they do not favour, or other 
voters. 
An important topic of the current discussion in the literature concerns those features of a 
country that support or discourage the emergence of a budgetary electoral cycle. Persson and 
Tabellini (2004) argue that electoral cycles in fiscal variables depend on electoral rules and forms of 
government. According to Brender and Drazen (2005), fiscal manipulation may work better in 
“new” rather than in “established” democracies because voters in the former may be inexperienced 
with electoral politics or may have less information available to evaluate fiscal manipulation. Shi 
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and Svensson (2006) claim that the size of the electoral budget cycles depends positively on 
politicians’ rents of remaining in power and, negatively, on the share of informed voters in the 
electorate. Alt and Lassen (2006), presented evidence that, conditioned by the degree of fiscal 
policy transparency, political budget cycles occur in advanced industrialized economies, and that 
they are larger in more politically polarized countries. 
The analysis of Portuguese intergovernmental grants is relevant to the literature on 
opportunistic political business cycles because Portugal is a relatively young democracy, and to 
date most of the research in this area has focused on established democracies. Since the first 
democratic elections in Portugal took place in 1976, and our dataset starts in 1979, we have an 
excellent laboratory to test whether or not the impact of political forces in the grant allocation 
process changed as democracy matured in the country. 
 
2.2. Literature on tactical redistribution 
Cox and McCubbins (1986) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) pioneered the theoretical 
literature on tactical redistribution under budget constraints. Cox and McCubbins (1986) developed 
a model where the optimal strategy for risk-averse political candidates is to promise redistributions 
of welfare favouring their closest supporters. However, according to Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1987, 
1993) models, the winning policy favours voters with weak party preferences. 
Building on these models, Dixit and Londregan (1996) argued that parties will woo swing 
voters if they are equally effective in allocating redistributive benefits to all groups, but parties will 
favour their core support group if they are more effective in delivering favours to them. In a 
subsequent paper, Dixit and Londregan (1998) showed that parties adjust both the ideological and 
pork-barrel components of policy to cater for groups with a higher concentration of swing voters 
and those whose cut-points3 shift more readily in response to the promises of transfers. 
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Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) tested the prediction of the Cox and McCubbins (1986) 
model and that of the Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) model.4 Using data for a temporary grant 
programme distributed by the Swedish central government to municipalities, they found strong 
evidence in favour of the latter model, and no support for the former. Also for the Swedish case, 
Johansson (2003) tested the Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998) model and reported evidence that 
municipalities with a high number of swing voters receive a higher proportion of intergovernmental 
grants. Using block grants from federal to sub-federal governments in Albania, Case (2001) found 
that more assistance was allocated not only to swing communes but also to those that might be 
pivotal to winning a majority of  seats in Parliament. On the contrary, Ansolabehere and Snyder 
(2006) analyzing state transfers to local governments in the U.S., found a substantial partisan bias in 
favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support, and little or no support for the 
swing voter model. 
In this paper we test the above-mentioned models along with other hypotheses regarding the 
impact of political forces in grant distribution from the central government to municipalities. To our 
knowledge, only Pereira (1996) investigated the determinants of intergovernmental grants in 
Portugal using a political-economic approach. He focused on the impact of the structure of the 
lobbying activities of local governments on grant design.5 In this paper we shed additional light on 
the influence of political forces in the Portuguese granting system by investigating additional 
hypotheses and by using a larger dataset, both in cross-sectional and temporal dimensions. 
 
3. The Portuguese political and institutional framework 
After almost fifty years of dictatorship, democracy was re-established in Portugal following 
the April 25th, 1974 revolution. The organs of sovereignty in Portugal are the President of the 
Republic, the Government, the Assembly of the Republic, and the Courts. The main duties of the 
Veiga, Linda & Pinho, Maria Manuel  6
President are: to serve as the head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; to set 
the dates of legislative elections after consulting the parties; to appoint the Prime Minister and the 
members of the Government suggested by the latter; to dissolve the Parliament and call for 
elections; and to promulgate and publish laws, decree-laws, and regulations. Generally the leader of 
the party that received the most votes in the last elections becomes the Prime Minister. The 
Assembly of the Republic is a unicameral Parliament composed of deputies elected for a period of 
four years by direct and secret universal adult suffrage. Parties present closed and blocked lists of 
candidates in each district6 and there is a proportional transformation of votes into seats according 
to the Hondt method.7 
From 1974 to 1987, several governments took office but none succeeded in staying in office 
for an entire four-year term. In the 1987 elections, after two years in office as a minority 
government, the People’s Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party (PPD/PSD) won a majority 
of parliamentary seats for the first time since the re-establishment of democracy. It returned as a 
majority government in the subsequent elections held in 1991. At the end of 1995, the party in 
office changed again: the Socialist Party (PS) won the elections and stayed in office until 2002. 
After that, the country was ruled by a coalition formed by the PPD/PSD and the Democratic and 
Social Centre/People’s Party (CDS/PP). Following a Presidential dismissal of the government, 
elections were called in February 2005. The country is currently run by the PS, which has a 
comfortable overall majority of seats in the National Assembly. See Table 1 for a description of the 
parties in office since 1979. 
[Table 1] 
The first Portuguese municipal elections were held in 1976 and, since then, eight elections 
have taken place. Election dates are fixed and defined exogenously, and all municipalities have 
elections on the same day. Until 1985, municipal elections occurred every three years, and after that 
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the term of municipal governments was extended to four years. Elections have always taken place 
in December, with the exception of the most recent one, which occurred in October 2005.8  
The Portuguese Constitution of 1976, the Local Power Law (Law n. 79/77) and the first 
Local Finance Law (Law n. 1/79) brought new responsibilities and more power to municipalities, 
allowing for local finance reform through the consolidation of financial decentralization. Local 
governments are responsible for improving the well-being of the population that resides in their 
jurisdiction. They promote social and economic development, territory organization, and supply 
local public goods (water and sewage, energy, transportation, housing, healthcare, education, 
culture, sports, defence of the environment and protection of the civilian population).9  
Transfers from the central government constitute the most important source of funding for 
municipalities. Although their importance has been decreasing over time, in 2002 they still 
represented 43.1% of total revenues for municipalities. Municipalities receive both conditional and 
unconditional grants.10 Conditional grants maintain more control for the central government and 
provide less discretion for the municipalities than unconditional grants. They are usually governed 
by contracts and specific programme requirements.11 The European Union’s funds are a special case 
of conditional grants. They are allocated to each municipality by a central government agency that 
must follow the EU guidelines in the selection of the projects to be financed.  
With unconditional grants, the discretion of the grant giver is more limited since the amount 
each municipality receives is determined by a formula. However, for the early years of democracy, 
there is anecdotal evidence of discrepancies between the values of grants determined according to 
the formula and the amounts that were actually distributed. One should also take into account the 
possibility of political manipulation of the formula by the incumbent government. Table 2 
summarizes the changes that occurred in the allocation criteria of unconditional grants.  
[Table 2] 
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The rules determining the total amount of unconditional grants to be transferred to 
municipalities, during most of the period analysed, left room for incumbent governments to set the 
figures according to their electoral agenda. We now proceed by reviewing the legislation on this 
specific topic. Law n. 1/79 required that the total amount of unconditional grants to municipalities 
constitute no less than 18% of the amount allocated to capital and current expenditures in the 
National Budget. After 1984, this percentage was established in the National Budget law. 
Therefore, the total amount of grants, though constrained by law, was not completely formula-
driven. The 1987 Local Finance Law changed the way the total amount of unconditional grants was 
determined by establishing that it should be annually adjusted on the basis of the expected change 
in the value-added tax (VAT) revenue, as written in the National Budget. Since this rule relied on 
expectations, there was still room for electoral politics to influence the total amount of grants. 
In 1998, a new law was approved (Law n. 42/98) which created the Municipal General Fund 
(MGF) and the Municipal Cohesion Fund (MCF).12 The total amount of these funds was set as a 
30.5% proportion (24% for FGM and 6.5% for FCM) of the actual tax revenues generated two years 
before by income taxes and the value-added tax. This represents an important change from the 
previous local finance law, which based the determination of the total amount of unconditional 
grants on expected tax collections. The National Budget Law of 2001 created a new fund to 
complement the MGF and the MCF: the Municipal Basis Fund (MBF), which allocates an equal 
amount of resources to each municipality. The total amount of these funds still represents 30.5% of 
the actual tax revenues generated two years before by the income taxes and the value-added tax, but 
the proportions for component funds are now 20.5% for MGF, 5.5% for MCF, and 4.5% for MBF. 
 
4. The baseline empirical model 
In this section we empirically investigate the politico-economic aspects of the grant 
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allocation process. We use as our laboratory a large and unexplored dataset containing information 
on all Portuguese mainland municipalities (278) from 1979 to 2002.13 We model real per capita 
grants to municipalities (GRANTit) as a function of (1) lags of the dependent variable, since grant 
programmes are likely to persist over a number of years, as are the political and normative factors 
that impact upon such grants; (2) a vector of variables related to the public choice idea that 
policymakers take into account their personal political interests in the grant allocation process 
(PUB_CHOICEit); and, (3) a vector of control variables associated with the normative approach, 
which  views the grant giver as a social welfare maximizer (NORMit). 
The dependent variable, GRANTit, is defined in per capita terms in order to take into 
account size differences among municipalities and avoid heteroskedasticity problems. It is 
measured in 1995 euros to control for price increases over time. We first consider the total amount 
of grants transferred to municipalities and then investigate those that are not formula-determined.14 
The first vector of variables (PUB_CHOICEit) consists of five political variables. To test the 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) model of rational opportunistic political budgetary cycles, we include a 
dummy variable equal to one in legislative election years, and to zero in the remaining years 
(LEG_ELECTit). Following the predictions of the model, central governments are expected to 
transfer a larger amount of funds to municipalities in legislative election years in order to increase 
their popularity.15 Following Rogoff and Sibert (1988), it is also likely that mayors lobby the central 
government to receive a larger amount of funds during municipal election years so that more 
resources are available for vote-enhancing expenditures.16 To test this hypothesis, a dummy 
variable equal to one in municipal election years, and to zero in the other years (MUN_ELECTit) 
was added to the model. We also consider a variable measuring the number of years that a mayor 
has been in office17 (YEARS_IN_OFFICEit) since mayoral expertise and knowledge of the granting 
process is likely to increase with time in office, thus increasing their ability to extract funds from 
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the central government. 
To investigate the possibility of tactical distribution of grants by the central government two 
variables are considered.18 The first one is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the 
mayor and the Prime Minister belong to the same political party (SAME_PARTYit). This variable 
allows us to test the Cox and McCubbins (1986) model, according to which the optimal strategy of 
political candidates is to favour their supporters. The second variable measures the difference in 
vote shares, expressed in absolute values, between the main party in the central government and its 
main opponent, in the last legislative election in each municipality (DIFFERENCE_%VOTES). 
This variable captures the closeness of the last legislative election at the municipal level. Following 
Case (2001) and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002), we use it as a proxy for the number of swing 
voters.19 With this variable, we test the Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan 
(1996, 1998) prediction that municipalities with many swing voters are targeted by the incumbent 
party as a strategy to win the next election.  
The second group of explanatory variables (NORMit) consists of demographic, economic 
and time variables that allow us to test whether the granting process strives for improvements in 
social welfare. To capture differences in local population needs we consider each municipality’s 
population, in thousands, (POPULATIONit-1), population squared (POPULATION_SQit-1), and the 
percentages of the population under 15 (%POP_UNDER15it-1), and over 65 years old 
(%POP_OVER65 it-1). The existence of economies of scale in the provision of services by local 
governments constitutes a rationale for per capita grants to decrease with community size. Since 
larger jurisdictions can provide identical public service levels with lower taxes, the central 
government should transfer fewer resources to them in order to promote horizontal equity. 
However, some authors have criticized this argument based on the idea that local public goods may 
have “privateness” characteristics.20 The estimated coefficients associated with the variables 
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%POP_UNDER15 and %POP_OVER65 are expected to be positive because these groups of the 
population demand specific services typically provided by local authorities, such as elementary 
education and facilities for the elderly. To proxy the macroeconomic situation of the country, we 
included the growth rate of GDP at 1995 prices (ΔGDPit-1). The macroeconomic performance of the 
country conditions tax revenues collected by the central government and, consequently, the amount 
of funds transferred to municipalities. A positive sign is expected for the estimated coefficient 
associated with this variable. Finally, we control for the passage of time by introducing a quadratic 
time trend (TREND and TREND_SQ). In this way, we capture time-effects that affect the 
distribution of grants equally across all municipalities. 
In this vector, all variables, except the trend, are lagged one year because it takes some time 
for demographic and economic data to be released and for policymakers to take them into account 
in the grants allocation process. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the 
empirical work.21 
[Table 3] 
The baseline empirical model is described in equation (1), where t represents the year, i the 
municipality, p the number of lags of the dependent variable included in the model,22 αj is a 
parameter to be estimated, β and γ are vectors of parameters to be estimated, υi is the individual 
effect of municipality i, and εit is the error term: 
GRANTit = ∑
=
p
1j
jα GRANTi,t-j + PUB_CHOICE’it β + NORM’it γ + υi + εit 
   i = 1 …, N; t = 1,…,T (1) 
The model described above could be estimated assuming municipalities’ individual effects 
as fixed or random. However, the lagged value of the dependent variable would be correlated with 
the error term εit, even if the latter was not serially correlated, leading to inconsistent model 
estimates. This would occur because there is a clear dominance of cross sections (N=278) over time 
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periods (T=24) in our sample. 
 Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
to solve these problems. By first differencing equation (1) individual effects (υi) are removed and 
the resulting equation becomes estimable by instrumental variables: 
ΔGRANTit = Δ∑
=
p
1j
jα GRANTi,t-j + ΔPUB_CHOICE’it β + ΔNORM’it γ + Δεit 
 i = 1 …, N;   t = 1,…,T (2) 
The valid instruments are: levels of the dependent variable, lagged two or more periods; levels of 
the endogenous variables, lagged two or more periods; levels of the pre-determined variables, 
lagged one or more periods; and the levels of the exogenous variables, current or lagged or, simply, 
the first differences of the exogenous variables. More moment conditions are available if we assume 
that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the individual effects. In this case, the first lags 
of these variables can be used as instruments in the levels equation. When the dependent variable 
and/or the independent variables are persistent, lagged differences of the dependent variable may 
also be valid instruments for the levels equations. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that this 
extended GMM estimator is preferable to that of Arellano and Bond (1991)23 in this particular case. 
 
5. Empirical results 
We start by investigating the determinants of the total amount of grants received by 
municipalities (expressed in real and per capita terms), and whether political effects changed over 
time as the country evolved from a new to an established democracy. We then proceed to study 
grants that are not determined by formulae (also in real per capita terms). All equations presented 
were estimated by the method system-GMM for linear dynamic panel data models.24 The variable 
measuring the number of years mayors have been in office was treated as an endogenous variable 
because transfers from the central government represent an important source of funding for local 
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governments, and spending decisions are likely to have an impact on electoral results. In equations 
for total grants, the instruments used for the lagged dependent variable and the endogenous variable 
(number of years in office) were the levels of these variables lagged 2 to 8 periods, in the equation 
in first differences,25 and once lagged first differences in the equation in levels. For non-formula 
grants equations, the same instruments were used but it was necessary to add level 9 of the 
dependent and the endogenous variable in order to have valid Sargan tests. Tables 4 to 6 report the 
two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.26 
 
Total grants 
Column 1 of Table 4 shows estimation results of our baseline model for total grants that 
includes all variables described in the previous section. Several findings are immediately evident. 
First, the statistical significance of lagged grants suggests that they are subject to considerable 
inertia.27 Second, of the five variables considered in the political vector, three turned out to be 
highly statistically significant. As predicted by the literature on opportunistic political budgetary 
cycles, grants increase during election years. It is important to recall that only after the local finance 
law of 1998 did the total amount of unconditional grants start to be determined by a formula based 
on actual tax revenues collected two years before. Before that, it was based on expectations for the 
tax revenues or set as a percentage of the National Budget expenditures. Therefore, the central 
government could easily manipulate the total amount of the “pork” to be distributed. Results 
indicate that, for all else equal, total grants per capita increase by 16.37 euros (of 1995) in 
municipal election years, a relative increase of 6.8% (compared to the sample mean of 239.4, recall 
Table 3). This is in accordance with our prior hypothesis that mayors lobby to receive more grants 
during balloting years in order to have more funds available for electoral campaigns and vote-
enhancing expenditures.28 During legislative election years total grants per capita increase by 11.86 
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euros, an increase of 5% (as compared to the sample mean of 239.4). In line with Rogoff and 
Sibert’s (1988) theoretical predictions, the central government increases the amount of grants 
distributed to municipalities to improve its popularity, and therefore, its likelihood of re-election.  
Concerning tactical distribution of grants, our estimates present strong evidence in favour of 
the Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1987, 1993) hypothesis that politicians 
target swing voters. The estimated coefficient associated with the variable 
DIFFERENCE_%VOTES is negative and highly statistically significant. On the contrary, no 
support is found for Cox and McCubbins’s (1986) idea that politicians favour their supporters. The 
dummy variable SAME_PARTY is not statistically significant, revealing that municipalities led by 
mayors that belong to the Prime Minister’s party are not favoured in the grant distribution process. 
These results are in line with those reported by Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johanson 
(2003), for the Swedish case, and by Case (2001), for Albania. Although correctly signed, the 
variable measuring the number of years a mayor has been in office is not statistically significant. 
[Table 4] 
Regarding the variables related to the normative approach to transfers, results indicate that 
grants per capita decline as the size of the community increases, until the population reaches about 
350 thousand inhabitants. As expected, grants per capita increase with the percentage of individuals 
under 15 and over 65 years old, suggesting that more funds are transferred to satisfy the specific 
needs of these two groups of the population. The growth rate of GDP, included to capture the 
macroeconomic performance of the country, also has the expected sign and is highly statistically 
significant. Finally, regarding the controls for the passage of time, the estimated coefficients 
associated with the variables TREND and TREND_SQ are both positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that grants do not only grow over time but that their growth rate is increasing.  
To test the robustness of the conclusion that, over the entire term, the central government 
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does not favour municipalities run by mayors of the same political colour, we substituted the 
dummy SAME_PARTY by a variable measuring the percentage of votes the party in the central 
government obtained in the previous legislative electoral balloting. This variable was not 
statistically significant (column 2), nor was an alternative variable standing for the number of votes 
for the party in the national government. We can, therefore, conclude that over the entire term, there 
is no support for the Cox and McCubbins (1986) model.  
Given the finding that grant funding rises in election years, we decided to investigate 
whether or not these increases are more pronounced towards municipalities led by mayors that 
belong to the Prime Minister’s party or to swing muncipalities. We, therefore, interacted the dummy 
variables for the municipal (MUN_ELECT) and legislative (LEG_ELECT) election years with the 
dummies SAME_PARTY and DIF_PARTY (=1-SAME_PARTY) and the variable 
DIFFERENCE_%VOTES. Results presented in column 3 reveal that, for municipal elections, both 
interactions are statistically significant and that the coefficient for “same-party” mayors is smaller 
than that for “different-party” mayors. However, a Wald test does not allow us to reject the 
hypothesis of equal coefficients between the two interaction variables. For legislative elections, the 
interaction variables were highly statistically significant, but the coefficient associated with same-
party governments is now larger and statistically different from that for different-party 
governments. In this case, a Wald test allows us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients for the 
two interaction variables. In a model including the interaction between the electoral dummies and 
the DIFFERENCE_%VOTES, these variables were not statistically significant. Regarding increases 
in transfers during electoral years no distinction seems to be made among municipalities regarding 
the number of swing voters.  
Finally, we tested whether increases in transfers are also visible in the year preceding an 
election. Results, presented in column 4, reveal that this occurs for both municipal and legislative 
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elections. Since some investments may take several months to reach completion and become visible 
to voters, it is not surprising that transfers start increasing in the year before an election. 
 
Political effects over time 
Motivated by Brender and Drazen’s (2005) finding that in a large sample of countries the 
political budget cycle was driven by the group of new democracies, in which Portugal was included, 
we decided to investigate whether the impact of political factors changed from the early years of 
democracy to the latter ones. Brender and Drazen (2005) used three alternative definitions for new 
democracy: the period comprising the first four competitive elections, the first ten years, and the 
first fifteen years after becoming democratic. When we apply these definitions to the Portuguese 
case, we get, respectively, 1985, 1983 and 1988 as the last year for the new democracy period. 
Using the three dates alternatively, we created two dummies to identify the new and the established 
democracy periods (NEW_DEM and ESTAB_DEM). We then interacted all of the political variables 
with these two dummies. Table 5 reports the results for the classification of years 1974 to 1988 as 
new democracy, and of years afterwards as established democracy.29  
[Table 5] 
Results indicate that central governments distributed grants strategically among 
municipalities only in the new democracy period: municipalities ran by mayors affiliated with the 
party in central government received more grants, as did those with many swing voters. These 
results are in line with Brender and Drazen (2005), since they may result from lower transparency 
in the grants distribution process during the early years of democracy, and voters’ as well as 
competing political parties’ inexperience with electoral politics. As in the previous table, experience 
accumulated by mayors in office is not statistically significant in any of the periods.  
Contrary to Brender and Drazen’s (2005) finding in a panel of countries, data for Portugal 
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suggests that opportunistic effects in grants were much smaller in the early years of democracy than 
afterwards.30 This result is not surprising if we take into account the political environment and the 
lack of transparency that characterizes the allocation of intergovernmental grants. During the new 
democracy period, six legislative elections took place and none of the parties achieved an overall 
majority of votes. It was a period of high political instability, during which uncertainty about the 
ability to complete a four-year term made it difficult for the incumbent party to plan and implement 
electoral policies.31 Furthermore, acquiring knowledge over time about the democratic system is not 
restricted to voters. Politicians also acquire greater experience, and their ability to implement 
electoral policies may increase. It is also worth mentioning Alt and Lassen’s (2005) result that, 
conditioned on the degree of fiscal policy transparency, electoral cycles exist in advanced 
industrialized economies. The Portuguese democracy has matured over the last thirty years, 
elections are free and there is freedom of press, but intergovernmental grants, given their 
specificity, are still an obscure topic for most Portuguese voters. Therefore, it is appealing for 
incumbents to manipulate them in order to improve their re-election prospects. 
 
Non-formula grants 
Taking into account that a significant amount of transfers to municipalities are distributed 
according to a formula-based fiscal rule (recall Table 2), we continued our empirical analysis by 
investigating non-formula grants. As already mentioned, the time span of available data is smaller 
(1984 to 2002), and there are many missing values in 1984 and 1985. Since very little of the new 
democracy period is covered, it is not possible to investigate whether the impact of political factors 
has changed as democracy consolidated.  
[Table 6] 
Evidence reported in Table 6 confirms our hypothesis that non-formula grants are subject to 
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political influences. The percentage increase in non-formula grants during electoral years is now of 
20.7% (as compared to the sample mean of 72.5) for municipal elections, and of 9.1% for 
legislative elections – in both cases a higher increase than for total grants. Despite having more 
discretionary power over this type of transfers, the central government does not seem to 
discriminate across municipalities according to a mayor’s party affiliation or the number of swing 
voters. This result is not surprising if we take into account that the sample period for non-formula 
based grants covers very little of the new democracy period. The impact of an additional year a 
mayor has been in office is not statistically significant, as is the case for total grants. Concerning the 
vector of normative variables, results reveal that estimated coefficients for POPULATION, 
POPULATION_SQ, %POP_OVER65, ΔGDP, TREND and TREND_SQ continue to be statistically 
significant. We can therefore conclude that the central government also takes into account the 
specific needs of the municipalities, as well as the macroeconomic situation of the country, when 
allocating non-formula grants. 
As was done for total grants, we interacted the dummy variables for the electoral years with 
the dummies SAME_PARTY and DIF_PARTY. Results, reported in column 2 of Table 6, are 
essentially the same as before. We can, therefore, conclude that party similarity between local and 
central governments only seems to be a relevant issue during legislative election years. As for total 
grants, non-formula grants start increasing in the year preceding an election (column 3). 
 
6. Conclusions 
Portugal is an excellent laboratory to test Brender and Drazen’s (2005) finding, on a panel 
of countries, that political budget cycles are phenomena of new democracies. Democracy was re-
established in Portugal in 1974, allowing us to observe a transition from a new to an established 
democracy. Using an unexplored and detailed sample consisting of all Portuguese mainland 
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municipalities, for the 1979 to 2002 period, we investigate the impact of political factors in the 
allocation of intergovernmental grants and whether they have changed over time. 
We find evidence that the grants allocation process is influenced both by economic 
conditions and political factors, which is consistent with the modern literature on the New Deal 
(Couch and Shughart, 1998; Wallis, 1998; Fishback et al., 2003). Our results present strong 
evidence that political factors exert an important role in this distribution process, and that their 
relative importance has changed from the early years of democracy to the latter ones. During the 
early years of democracy, municipalities ruled by mayors that belonged to the Prime Minister’s 
party, and with more swing voters, were favoured in the distribution process. These phenomena are 
not visible in the established democracy period. However, increases in the amount of grants 
transferred to municipalities during municipal and legislative election years are larger in the second 
period of the sample (1989-2002), than in the first one (1979-1988).  
The reduction over time of the impact of tactical factors in the allocation of grants goes in 
the expected direction. That is, as democracy matured, governments’ political manipulations when 
distributing the total amount of the “pie” among municipalities diminished. However, opportunist 
effects increased over time. This result may be associated with politicians’ acquisition of 
knowledge about electoral politics, and to the reduction of political instability. In the later years of 
the sample, strong single party governments managed to stay in office for their entire terms. 
Opportunism is more attractive for a single-party government than for a coalition government, and 
the ability of a strong single party-government to implement electoral policies is also larger. 
Regarding voters, this result suggests that the transfer of resources between different levels of 
governments is still an obscure topic, making it difficult for them to see through the electoral 
policies and punish opportunistic incumbents at elections. This is an issue that deserves further 
attention in order to implement measures that enhance voters’ knowledge of intergovernmental 
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grants and to reduce the scope of strategic behaviour by incumbent politicians and the losses in 
welfare they may generate.  
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1. Since there are no states or administrative regions in mainland Portugal, municipalities are the highest ranking 
authorities below the national government. 
2. See Oates (1999) for a survey on fiscal federalism. 
3. In this model, the actual social welfare function associated with any voter is a weighted sum of the rightist and the 
leftist social welfare functions. The cut-point corresponds to the critical value of the weights attributed to the 
rightist/leftist social welfare functions which make voters indifferent between the two parties. 
4. Previous empirical research on the political economy of intergovernmental grants had already investigated these 
hypotheses, although some lack a strict theoretical ground. Among others see Wright (1974), Alperovich (1984), Gist 
and Hill (1984), Bungey et al. (1991), Grossman (1994), Pereira (1996), Worthington and Dollery (1998). 
5. For analysis of the effects of lobbying activities in the allocation of grants see also Grossman (1994), Worthington 
and Dollery (1998), Bork and Owings (2003), Lowry and Potoski (2004), and Feld and Schaltegger (2005). 
6. There are eighteen districts in mainland Portugal. Municipalities are subdivisions of districts. 
7. After the votes are tallied, averages are calculated in order to determine the number of seats each party receives. The 
formula for this average is V/(s+1), where V is the number of votes each party list received and s is the number of seats 
the party has been allocated so far. At the beginning, the value of s is zero. The party with the highest average gets the 
seat. Each round of averaging determines which party gets the next seat. 
8. Municipal elections took place on December 12, 1976; December 16, 1979; December 12, 1982; December 15, 1985; 
December 17, 1989; December 12, 1993; December 14, 1997; December 16, 2001; and October 9, 2005.  
9. Most of the local public goods provided by municipalities are highly visible to citizens. 
10. The ratio of conditional to unconditional grants has increased considerably over time, from 14.2% in 1987 to 42.3% 
in 2002. 
11. The first Local Finance Law mentioned the possibility of conditional financial help for municipalities from the 
central government in case of public disaster or unusual circumstances. The Law n. 1/87 considered the possibility of 
technical and financial cooperation between the central government and municipalities aiming at the promotion of 
regional and local development. In 1998, a new Local Finance Law was enacted allowing for help from the central 
government if regional development was at stake or if there was an urgent need for funds that could not be provided by 
the municipality. The regulatory framework for conditional financial help is established by the central government in 
the form of decree-laws (legislation issued by the government by permission of the Parliament). 
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12. The MGF was created to provide municipalities with adequate financial resources for the execution of their tasks, 
according to their levels of operation and investment. The MCF intends to promote horizontal balance, that is, to reduce 
inequity among local jurisdictions. This fund is only transferred to municipalities that have a development index below 
the national average. 
13. Overseas municipalities belonging to the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira were excluded from the 
analysis since there is an intermediate level between these municipalities and the central government, they benefit from 
the status of ultraperiferic regions in terms of EU funds, and the inhabitants of islands may have specific needs. 
Regarding the Portuguese geographical organization, it should be noted that during the period analyzed four new 
municipalities were created: Amadora, in 1979, and Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela, in 1998. 
14. Levin-Lin-Chu and Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root tests reject the hypothesis that total grants and non-formula 
grants are non-stationary. 
15. However, if we follow the Worthington and Dollery (1998: 306) argument that the returns from purchasing political 
capital by increasing transfers to local jurisdictions may be off-set by direct returns to central government politicians 
resulting from increases in national public expenditures, a negative effect should be expected. 
16. Recall that, during the period analysed, municipal elections in Portugal always took place in December. 
17. There are no term limits in Portugal. 
18. In Portugal, the number of deputies in the National Assembly elected by each electoral district (geographically-based 
constituency upon which Portugal's representative democracy is based) is determined according to their respective 
share of the national population. Furthermore, in mainland Portugal, there are eighteen electoral districts, each one 
comprising several municipalities. Therefore, we cannot test whether jurisdictions with a larger representation in the 
national parliament are treated differently in the allocation of grants.  
19. Johanson (2003) noted that this proxy is only valid if we assume that the distribution of ideological preferences 
among voters is symmetric and single-peaked. She proposed an alternative way to estimate the number of swing voters 
based on survey data from Swedish election studies. Unfortunately, we cannot follow this methodology in the 
Portuguese case because we are dealing with panel data, and there are no election studies covering the whole period 
analysed. 
20. For a discussion on this issue see Pereira (1996). 
21. Data sources are described in the Data Appendix. 
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22. The optimal number of lags was determined according to their statistical significance and the absence of auto-
correlation. 
23. Since there is some persistence of transfers and of some independent variables, it is appropriate to estimate this 
system-GMM. Furthermore, Sargan tests indicate that, for our data, the system-GMM is preferable to the GMM that 
only includes the first-differenced equations. 
24. To test the robustness of the results to other econometric methods, we estimated a dynamic model using the 
Anderson-Hsiao estimator, and a static model with the errors clustered over local governments. Results were similar.  
25. All equations were also estimated including all available instruments, and results were essentially the same. Although 
there is a gain in efficiency when all available instruments are used, there is a loss of power, since we get weak 
instruments in the long lags. 
26. Although it is more common to present the one-step results because the two-step standard errors are generally biased 
downwards, that problem does not apply to our case, since the econometric software Stata 9.1 uses the finite-sample 
correction suggested by Windmeijer (2005). Thus, we present the two-step results, as these are consistent in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. 
27. The choice of the number of lags to include was based on their statistical significance and on the need to avoid 
second order autocorrelation of the residuals.  
28. Veiga and Veiga’s (2007) empirical results reveal the opportunistic behaviour of the Portuguese mayors, who 
increase, in pre-electoral periods, expenditure items highly visible to the electorate, such as investment expenditures on 
overpasses, streets and complementary works, and rural roads. 
29. If we use 1983/1985 as breakings points, the new democracy period only covers two/three elections of the eight 
included in the sample period. The 1979 election is dropped because the first lag of the dependent variable is included 
in the model. Nevertheless, estimation results regarding the importance of opportunistic and tactical manipulation of 
grants in the two periods are essentially the same. 
30. Wald tests allow us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients for both municipal and legislative elections. To test 
the robustness of these results we divided the panel into two sub samples, according to the periods considered. 
Estimation results were essentially the same as those obtained when using the interaction variables. 
31. Legislative election dates are set exogenously from the perspective of central governments. The President of the 
Republic decides them. 
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Data appendix 
Data on total transfers from the central government to the local authorities and 
municipalities’ area were obtained from the Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais’s annual report 
Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances). This report exists for the years 1979 to 1983 and 1986 
to 2002. For the two missing years, data was obtained directly from the municipalities’ official 
accounts. For these two years the dataset is incomplete: we have 175 observations for 1984 and 180 
for 1985. Data on non-formula grants was obtained from the same sources but is available for a 
shorter time span: from 1984 to 2002. 
Data on total population and population by age groups in each municipality was obtained 
from the Portuguese National Statistics Office (Instituto Nacional de Estatística – INE)’s Census 
operations that took place in 1981, 1991 and 2001. For the remaining years, data on total population 
was collected from INE’s Estimates of Resident Population. Data on population by age groups was 
obtained by assuming a constant growth rate for the period 1979-1989, on the basis of the 1970 and 
1981 Census operations; for the rest of the period, annual data was acquired from the INE’s 
Estimates of Resident Population. Gross Domestic Product and consumer price indexes were 
acquired from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. 
Political data, namely election dates and municipal and legislative electoral results, was obtained 
from the National Electoral Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições) and from the Technical 
Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process (Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o 
Processo Eleitoral - STAPE) of the Internal Affairs Ministry. 
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Table 1: Legislative elections and parties in government 
Dates of elections Winning party 
Share in 
Parliament Prime Minister Form of government 
April 25, 1976 
- 
- 
December 2, 1979 
October 5, 1980 
April 25, 1983 
October 6, 1985 
July 19, 1987 
October 6, 1991 
October 1, 1995 
October 10, 1999 
March 17, 2002 
February 20, 2005 
PS 
- 
- 
AD 
AD 
PS 
PPD/PSD 
PPD/PSD 
PPD/PSD 
PS 
PS 
PPD/PSD 
PS 
43% 
- 
- 
51.2% 
53.6% 
40.4% 
35.2% 
59.2% 
58.7% 
48.7% 
50.0% 
45.7% 
52.6% 
Mário Soares 
Mota Pinto 
M. L. Pintassilgo
Sá Carneiro 
Pinto Balsemão 
Mário Soares 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
António Guterres
António Guterres
Durão Barroso(a)
José Sócrates 
One party, minority 
Pres. appointment (1978-79) 
Pres. appointment (1979-80) 
Coalition (PSD+CDS+PPM), majority
Coalition (PSD+CDS+PPM), majority 
Coalition (PS+PSD), majority 
One party, minority 
One party, majority 
One party, majority 
One party, minority 
One party, minority 
Coalition (PSD+CDS/PP), majority 
One party, majority 
 
Source: National Elections Commission. 
Notes: PPD/PSD - People’s Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party; PS - Socialist Party; CDS/PP - Democratic 
and Social Centre / People’s Party; PPM - Monarchic People’s Party; AD = PSD + CDS + PPM. 
 (a) In July 2004 Durão Barroso resigned and a new government, also a coalition of PSD and CDS/PP was 
formed under the leadership of Santana Lopes. 
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Table 2: Allocation criteria of unconditional grants to municipalities  
 Law n. 1/79 Law n. 42/98 National Budget Law 2001 
 artº 5º.b) artº 5º.c)
Decree-law 
n. 98/84 
Law n. 
1/87 
National Budget 
Law 1992 MGF MCF MGF MCF MBF 
Population 50% 35% 45% 45% - - - -  - 
Population/Nights spent in tourism facilities - - - - 40% 35% - 40%  - 
Area 10% 15% 10% 10% 15% 30% (a) - 30%  - 
Per capita direct taxes 40% - 15% 10% - - - 10%  - 
Single Income Tax - - - - - 10% - - - - 
Fiscal needs index - - - - 5% - - -  - 
Number of freguesias (b) - 15% 5% 5% 5% 15% - 15%  - 
Road Network - (c) - 10% 10% - - -  - 
Number of dwellings - - - 5% - - - -  - 
Accessibility index - - - (d) 5% - - -  - 
Needs index - 35% 20% - - - - -  - 
Socio-economic development index - - - 5% - - - -  - 
Population under 15 years old - - - - 5% 5% - 5%  - 
Development index (e) - - - - - - 100% - 100% - 
Equal amount to all municipalities - - 5% 10% 15% 5% - -  100% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Diário da República. 
Notes:  (a) weighted by a factor related to altimetry; (b) freguesias are subdivisions of municipalities; (c) included in the needs index; (d) included in the socio-economic 
development index; (e) allocated only to municipalities with an index below the national average. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables N.Obs. Average StandardDeviation Minimum Maximum
Grants:   
Total grants (1979-2002) 6 403 248.4 177.4 14.8 1 507.2
Non-formula grants (1984-2002) 5 032 72.5 73.7 0.0   804.2
Political variables:   
Municipal election year 6 889 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0
Legislative election year 6 889 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0
Same party 6 877 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0
Difference_%Votes 6 334 21.9 16.5 0.0 79.4
Years in office 6 870 6.4 4.9 1.0 27.0
Demographic, economic and time variables   
Population (thousands) 6 893 34.7 59.9 1.9 808.0
Population squared 6 893 4 794.0 31 599.0 3.4 652 928.6
% Population under 15 years-old 6 888 19.0 4.7 7.5 36.6
% Population over 65 years-old 6 888 17.5 5.9 5.4 41.7
Growth of GDP at 1995 prices 6 950 2.8 2.4 -1.9 8.4
Trend 6 950 13.0 7.2 1.0 25.0
Trend squared 6 950 221.0 193.1 1.0 625.0
Sources: DGAL, INE, IMF and STAPE. 
Note:  All types of grants are expressed in euros (at 1995 prices) per capita. 
 Data for grants goes from 1979 to 2002, for the remaining variables from 1979 to 2003. 
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Table 4: Estimation results for total grants (1979-2002) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GRANT(-1) .84 
(50.72)*** 
.84 
(50.66)*** 
.84 
(50.70)*** 
.85 
(52.15)*** 
MUN_ELECT 16.37 
(8.36)*** 
16.79 
(8.49)*** 
 28.19 
(9.13)*** 
MUN_ELECT*SAME_PARTY   15.20 
(5.75)*** 
 
MUN_ELECT*DIF_PARTY   17.48 
(6.52)*** 
 
MUN_ELECT(-1)    18.47 
(6.11)*** 
LEG_ELECT  11.86 
(7.73)*** 
11.68 
(7.58)*** 
 29.75 
(8.03)*** 
LEG_ELECT*SAME_PARTY   15.04 
(6.46)*** 
 
LEG_ELECT*DIF_PARTY   9.39 
(4.14)*** 
 
LEG_ELECT(-1)    14.08 
(4.03)*** 
SAME_PARTY 1.97 
(1.06) 
 .80 
(.34) 
2.16 
(1.15) 
DIFFERENCE_%VOTES -.14 
(-2.78)*** 
-.09 
(-1.48) 
-.14 
(-2.66)** 
-.12 
(-2.35)** 
YEARS_IN_OFFICE .39 
(1.63) 
.37 
(1.54) 
.40 
(1.63) 
.30 
(1.21) 
%VOTES_GOV  -5.95 
(-1.45) 
  
POPULATION(-1) -.14 
(-3.36)*** 
-.14 
(-3.02) 
-.16 
(-3.25)*** 
-.15 
(-3.15)*** 
POPULATION_SQ(-1) .0002 
(2.56)** 
.0002 
(2.57)** 
.0002 
(2.69)** 
.0002 
(2.58)** 
%_POP_UNDER15(-1) 1.59 
(3.69)*** 
1.69 
(3.89)*** 
1.60 
(3.72)*** 
1.46 
(3.41)*** 
%_POP_OVER65(-1) 4.45 
(8.09)*** 
4.50 
(8.29)*** 
4.44 
(8.12)*** 
4.29 
(7.97)*** 
Δ GDP(-1) 3.43 
(11.04)*** 
3.38 
(10.49)*** 
3.42 
(11.02)*** 
4.18 
(10.39)*** 
TREND 1.47 
(3.27)*** 
1.37 
(3.03)*** 
1.47 
(3.32)*** 
3.02 
(5.49)*** 
TREND_SQ .03 
(2.13)** 
.04 
(2.37)** 
.04 
(2.14)** 
-.02 
(-.8) 
m1 -8.50 -8.53 -8.52 -8.50 
m2 .95 1.00 .94 1.00 
Sargan (p-value) .54 .52 .55 .54 
No. Observations 5 998 6000 5 998 5 998 
No. Municipalities 278 278 278 278 
Notes: - Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-
differences with the equation in levels), using the econometric software STATA 9.1; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; 
**, 5%; and *, 10%. 
- m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
- Sargan is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2. P-value is reported. 
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Table 5: Total grants: new (1979-1988) versus established democracy (1989-2002) 
MUN_ELECT_NEW_DEM 5.24 
(2.15)** 
MUN_ELECT_ESTAB_DEM 21.73 
(8.55)*** 
LEG_ELECT_NEW_DEM 5.31 
(3.23)*** 
LEG_ELECT_ESTAB_DEM 18.33 
(7.80)*** 
SAME_PARTY_NEW_DEM 4.41 
(2.05)** 
SAME_PARTY_ESTAB_DEM 1.65 
(.66) 
DIF_%VOTES_NEW_DEM -.32 
(-6.05)*** 
  
DIF_%VOTES_EST_DEM -.12 
(-1.57) 
  
YEARS_IN_OFFICE_NEW_DEM .32 
(.94) 
YEARS_IN_OFFICE_ESTAB_DEM .23 
(1.01) 
  
m1 -8.54 
m2 .78 
Sargan (p-value) .55 
No. Observations 5 998 
No. Municipalities 278 
Notes: - Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-
differences with the equation in levels), using the econometric software Stata 9.1; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
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Table 6: Estimation results for non-formula grants (1984-2002) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GRANT(-1) .45 
(16.83)*** 
.45 
(16.88)*** 
.45 
(17.04)*** 
MUN_ELECT 15.02 
(7.78)*** 
 23.98 
(5.49)*** 
MUN_ELECT*SAME_PARTY  14.94 
(4.87)*** 
 
MUN_ELECT*DIF_PARTY  15.83 
(5.89)*** 
 
MUN_ELECT(-1)   14.18 
(2.91)** 
LEG_ELECT  6.58 
(4.121)*** 
 19.07 
(3.53)*** 
LEG_ELECT*SAME_PARTY  9.36 
(3.52)*** 
 
LEG_ELECT*DIF_PARTY  4.48 
(2.06)** 
 
LEG_ELECT(-1)   11.36 
(2.12)** 
SAME_PARTY 2.41 
(1.15) 
1.48 
(.59) 
2.49 
(1.20) 
DIFFERENCE_%VOTES -.05 
(-.75) 
-.06 
(-.79) 
-.06 
(-.88) 
YEARS_IN_OFFICE .37 
(1.44) 
.35 
(1.39) 
.34 
(1.30) 
POPULATION(-1) -.18 
(-3.58)*** 
-.17 
(-3.56)*** 
-.17 
(-3.46)*** 
POPULATION_SQ(-1) .0002 
(2.44)** 
.0002 
(2.45)** 
.0002 
(2.36)** 
%POP_UNDER15(-1) .01 
(.02) 
.03 
(.05) 
.09 
(.16) 
%POP_OVER65(-1) 2.35 
(4.58)*** 
2.36 
(4.60)*** 
2.39 
(4.69)*** 
ΔGDP(-1) 1.44 
(4.41)*** 
1.45 
(4.43)*** 
1.62 
(4.12)*** 
TREND 7.67 
(5.00)*** 
5.52 
(4.81)*** 
7.67 
(5.00)*** 
TREND_SQ -.18 
(-3.45)*** 
-.10 
(-2.79)*** 
-.18 
(-3.45)*** 
m1 -7.73 -7.75 -7.70 
m2 .15 .14 .10 
Sargan (p-value) .16 .16 .17 
No. Observations 4 735 4 732 4 735 
No. Municipalities 278 275 278 
Notes: - Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-
differences with the equation in levels), using the econometric software Stata 9.1; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
